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Abstract: Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the 
facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic 
exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology. I will show that their 
argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it 
necessary for the religious exclusivist to support his exclusive beliefs with significant reasons 
is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to 
demonstrate that it is impossible for basic exclusive religious beliefs to return to their properly 
basic state after defeaters against them have been defeated. Finally, I consider whether there is 
perhaps a similar but better argument in the neighbourhood and conclude in the negative. 
Reformed Epistemology’s defence of exclusivism thus remains undefeated. 
 
Introduction 
 
A religious exclusivist maintains that her own religion is superior to other religions in the 
sense of it being the only true religion.1 According to Reformed Epistemology (RE), an 
exclusivist’s religious beliefs can be rational or warranted in the manner of properly basic 
beliefs, i.e., without being based on reasons or arguments. Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune 
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(2008) criticize this claim and argue that an exclusivist who has become (fully) aware of the 
facts of religious pluralism can no longer be rational in holding her religious beliefs in the 
basic way.2 The facts of pluralism give her a defeater that can only be defeated by acquiring 
and retaining ‘epistemically significant reasons’ to support her religious beliefs. 
 I will argue that Baldwin and Thune’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the champion 
of RE need not concede the necessity of epistemically significant reasons to defeat the 
defeater that pluralism gives her. Secondly, even if she were to concede that reasons are 
necessary, it remains possible—in spite of Baldwin and Thune’s claim to the contrary—that 
these reasons can be discarded once the defeater of pluralism has been defeated so that the 
exclusivist’s religious beliefs return to their former proper basicality. After that, I will 
consider whether there is perhaps a better argument against exclusivism in the vicinity, but 
conclude in the negative. 
 
Baldwin and Thune on religious pluralism and defeat 
 
Full awareness of religious pluralism provides an exclusivist with trustworthy testimony, the 
content of which conflicts with her own religious beliefs. Testimony is a source of basic 
beliefs.3 So upon appreciating the facts of pluralism the exclusivist acquires basic beliefs that 
conflict with her own basic religious beliefs. Since, for all the exclusivist can tell, there is 
complete internal epistemic parity between her and adherents of other (incompatible) 
religions, these conflicting beliefs will act as a defeater for her own religious beliefs. 
Moreover, pluralism also acts as a defeater for any belief of hers to the effect that she has 
access to a special source of religious knowledge such as a sensus divinitatis or the internal 
instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS), as in Alvin Plantinga’s (2000) extended Aquinas/Calvin 
(A/C) model for warranted Christian belief. In other words, the exclusivist cannot simply 
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appeal to her having such access in order to defeat the defeater that pluralism gives her. That 
is because adherents of other religions might make analogous appeals to such special sources 
of religious knowledge and testify that these sources produce in them their specific religious 
beliefs, which are incompatible with those of the exclusivist. This calls into question the 
reliability of the exclusivist’s special source of religious knowledge. 
 In order for the exclusivist’s religious beliefs to become rational4 again, say Baldwin and 
Thune, she needs ‘epistemically significant reasons’ (2008, 451), i.e., ‘at a minimum, some 
argumentation, evidence, or inference to other beliefs’ (ibid., 453), which will either support 
her own beliefs directly or indirectly, by giving her reasons to discount incompatible religious 
beliefs. In other words: 
 
Necessity of Reasons (NR) Rationality requires that the religious exclusivist who is fully 
aware of the facts of religious pluralism have epistemically significant reasons to support 
her religious beliefs. 
 
By acquiring support from such reasons, however, the exclusivist’s religious beliefs cease to 
be basic. Hence, Baldwin and Thune’s conclusion: those who are aware of pluralism cannot 
hold their religious beliefs rationally in the manner of properly basic beliefs. 
 But there is one possible escape to this line of reasoning, as Baldwin and Thune rightly 
point out. Perhaps epistemically significant reasons are needed only to discard the defeater but 
can be disposed of once that has been accomplished. Imagine that you look at a table in 
normal daylight and form the belief that it is red. Then your friend John comes along and tells 
you that the table is really white but is currently illuminated by red light. This gives you a 
defeater for your original belief. Five minutes later, however, John tells you that he was only 
joking. This defeats your defeater. You can forget about John’s earlier testimony and your 
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original belief goes back to being a properly basic perceptual belief again. (See Plantinga 
(1993, 185) for a structurally similar case.) If something analogous is possible for religious 
belief that threatens to be defeated by pluralism, the exclusivist’s belief could return to its 
original state of proper basicality after all. 
 To block this escape, Baldwin and Thune (2008, 453) distinguish between Drain-O and 
table-leg defeater-defeaters. A Drain-O defeater effectively flushes itself out along with the 
defeater it defeats, so that the original belief can remain rational in exactly the way it was. It 
adds nothing to the original support for your belief, but only serves to discard the defeater. 
The red table case above is an example. In contrast, a table-leg defeater-defeater must be 
retained for the original belief to remain rational because it defeats a defeater by 
supplementing or even replacing the support for the original belief. Suppose your friend Bob 
tells you that Alice was at the party. You then learn that Bob had a few drinks too much and 
can’t remember clearly who was and was not present at the party. This gives you a defeater 
for your belief that Alice was at the party. The next day you run into Alice, who confirms that 
she was at the party. This defeats your defeater and at the same time supplements (or 
replaces) the support for your belief that Alice was at the party. In order for your belief to 
remain rational, you must retain this defeater-defeater. Baldwin and Thune boldly assert that 
the epistemically significant reasons required to defeat the defeater presented by pluralism 
will always be table-legs (ibid., 453). Hence: 
 
Retainment of Reasons (RR) The epistemically significant reasons referred to in NR are 
always such that they must be retained in order for an exclusivist’s religious beliefs to 
remain rational. 
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In the next section, I will show that the reformed epistemologist need not accept NR. In the 
section after that, I will argue that even if NR is accepted, RR can still be denied as its only 
plausible defence leads to unattractive fairly widespread scepticism. 
 
Are reasons necessary? 
 
The fundamentally sound intuition behind NR is that defeater-defeat requires something extra 
beyond the initial belief and its support. You cannot defeat a defeater for a belief by means of 
that very belief itself or the support you already have for it. Attempting to defend a belief 
merely by, as it were, stomping one’s feet and holding onto it falls short of what rationality 
requires. 
 Baldwin and Thune immediately go on to limit the admissible kinds of additional support 
to just one, namely reasons. For someone who sympathizes with RE that is a crucial mistake. 
For why could additional support not come from something else than reasons, such as 
perception, memory, or further testimony? This happens in many everyday cases of defeater-
defeat. Recall the red table case from above but now suppose that John hadn’t told you he was 
joking. Could you not have defeated your defeater by further perception, i.e., by taking a 
closer look at the table, perhaps checking for the presence of nearby red lamps? Or take a case 
of memory belief. You remember having eaten a grapefruit for breakfast yesterday, when 
your partner tells you that she is convinced that it was an orange. You consult your memory 
again and vividly remember the look, smell, and taste of yesterday’s grapefruit. By doing so, 
you defeat the defeater you acquired through your partner’s testimony. For the case of 
religious belief this would mean—in terms of Plantinga’s extended A/C model—that a 
renewed and more powerful working of your sensus divinitatis and/or a more powerful IIHS 
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could serve to defeat the defeater you acquired through becoming aware of the facts of 
religious pluralism. 
 Indeed, this is exactly what Plantinga himself seems to have in mind. Consider first the 
following passage, also quoted by Baldwin and Thune: 
 
Perhaps you have always believed it deeply wrong for a counselor to use his position of 
trust to seduce a client. Perhaps you discover that others disagree; they think it more like a 
minor peccadillo, like running a red light when there’s no traffic; and you realize that 
possibly these people have the same internal markers for their beliefs that you have for 
yours. You think the matter over more fully, imaginatively re-create and rehearse such 
situations, become more aware of just what is involved in such a situation (the breach of 
trust, the injustice and unfairness, the nasty irony of a situation in which someone comes to 
a counselor seeking help but receives only hurt), and come to believe even more firmly 
that such an action is wrong. (Plantinga 2000, 457) 
 
Baldwin and Thune interpret this passage as affirming NR. Thinking the matter over more 
fully, they believe, gives you reasons to support your belief that it is wrong for a counsellor to 
use his position of trust to seduce a client. These reasons then form an indispensable 
supplement to the support your moral belief had before from, presumably, moral intuition. 
Without them, your contested moral belief could not be held rationally anymore. 
 In view of Plantinga’s insistence on the possibility of rational basic religious belief, even 
for intellectually sophisticated exclusivists who are well aware of pluralism, such an 
interpretation is markedly uncongenial, if not plain wrong. So instead of interpreting this 
passage as affirming NR, we would do better by interpreting it along the lines of my earlier 
suggestion. The idea would then be that your thinking carefully about the situation occasions 
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a renewed and more powerful working of your moral intuition, which defeats the defeater you 
acquired upon learning that others disagree. The case of moral beliefs is particularly well-
suited to illustrate this possibility, since there is a respectable strand in the literature on moral 
realism that defends moral intuitionism; the idea that we grasp moral truths through a 
cognitive faculty of moral intuition (Moore 1903, Ross 1930, Audi 2004, Huemer 2005). 
These intuitionists hold that belief in moral truths is not rational in virtue of being based on 
reasons, but in a non-inferential way. Nonetheless, thinking carefully about the facts involved 
in morally significant situations is necessary to intuit the moral truth of the matter correctly. 
Not because it provides us with reasons necessary to support our moral beliefs, but because it 
occasions correct functioning of our intuition. 
 Something analogous may well apply to the case of religious beliefs. Thinking carefully 
about the facts of religious pluralism could facilitate a renewed and more powerful working of 
your sensus divinitatis and/or the IIHS—the same cognitive processes by which your religious 
beliefs originally arose. To make this more vivid: imagine that you ponder over your 
Christian beliefs and rehearse some of the relevant facts about Christian theism, while also 
keeping in mind that other thoughtful and intelligent people hold incompatible religious 
beliefs. Your pondering occasions a powerful working of the Holy Spirit which reproduces 
your Christian theistic belief with great force and internal compellingness. Although you find 
the epistemic situation very complex, you cannot help but feel strongly convinced again that 
your religious beliefs are true, even though you admittedly have nothing to offer by way of 
independent evidence or arguments that will move those who hold incompatible religious 
beliefs even the slightest bit. 
 To drive home the point that this is indeed what Plantinga has in mind, the following 
passage should suffice:5 
 
8 
 
A fresh or heightened awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a 
reappraisal of one’s religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grasp 
and apprehension of (1) and (2). From the perspective of the extended A/C model, it could 
serve as an occasion for a renewed and more powerful working of the belief-producing 
processes by which we come to apprehend (1) and (2). In this way knowledge of the facts 
of pluralism could initially serve as a defeater; in the long run, however, it can have 
precisely the opposite effect. The facts of religious pluralism, therefore, (…) do not or need 
not constitute a defeater for Christian belief. (Plantinga 2000, 457, my italics) 
 
If all of this is correct, then NR is false. An exclusivist who is aware of the facts of pluralism 
does not necessarily need reasons to support her religious beliefs after all.6 
 Even if what I have said so far is successful as an exercise in Plantinga-exegesis, we 
should still ask whether the suggested procedure for defeater-defeat has any plausibility. This 
is not the occasion for a full evaluation, but I can reply to four worries. 
 First, religious pluralism also provided the exclusivist with a defeater for any belief to the 
effect that the exclusivist possesses a special source of religious knowledge, so how can it be 
legitimate to rely on this very source to defeat the defeater? The answer to this lies in the 
realisation that RE promotes a strongly externalist account of rationality, on which rationality 
is determined almost exclusively by the de facto proper functioning of the subject’s cognitive 
faculties and emphatically not by her having access to higher-order information about the 
epistemic pedigree or status of her beliefs.7 Specifically, rationality does not require a subject 
first to have good reasons to believe a cognitive faculty to be reliable (or any other higher-
order beliefs) before she can rationally believe the outputs of that faculty. Rather, it can go the 
other way around: when called for, a subject can infer higher-order beliefs from first-order 
beliefs that have been formed by de facto properly functioning cognitive processes.8 
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 This idea can then be extended to defeater-defeat. Applied to the problem at hand, a new 
and powerful working of the sensus divinitatis or further IIHS—de facto properly functioning 
faculties—will provide the additional support required for the exclusivist’s (first-order) 
religious beliefs to become rational again. Finding herself with a strengthened conviction that 
her beliefs are true, the exclusivist will by implication (1) take incompatible religious beliefs 
held by adherents of other religions to be false and (2) take others who claim to have had 
incompatible religious experiences to be somehow epistemically less fortunate and their 
testimony therefore of reduced value.9 In doing so, she defeats both the direct defeater for her 
first-order religious beliefs and the defeater for the higher-order belief that she has access to a 
special source of religious knowledge. 
 For those who remain sceptical, I should emphasize that this procedure for defeater-defeat 
is nothing more than a straightforward reapplication of RE’s basic externalist conception of 
rationality. Recall that, according to RE, a subject can have rational beliefs while the fact that 
she has them, as well as other details of her epistemic status are (almost) completely opaque 
to her. In particular, she need not (1) have access to the grounds for her beliefs, (2) believe 
that her cognitive faculties are functioning properly or be able to offer arguments to that 
effect, and (3) believe—let alone be rational or warranted in believing or know—that her 
beliefs are rational. To the extent that you are willing to accept this as a basic conception of 
rationality, you should have no real problem also accepting the procedure for defeater-defeat 
under consideration, because that procedure merely reapplies the basic conception to defeater-
defeat. Defeaters for a belief can be defeated when that belief is reproduced (with greater 
strength) by cognitive faculties which are assumed to be de facto functioning properly. Just as 
before, the belief’s being produced by de facto properly functioning cognitive faculties is 
what makes it rational again. By implication, defeaters for this belief are defeated. 
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 Secondly, what I have been saying entails that an exclusivist can rationally hold religious 
beliefs in the basic way without having anything by way of a reason or argument to defeat the 
defeater of religious pluralism. The exclusivist would simply have to find herself with a firm 
conviction that her beliefs really are right, in spite of counter-testimony from seemingly 
trustworthy sources. Perhaps someone will want to object to this on the grounds that it ‘allows 
exclusive religious beliefs to be effectively immune from defeat, and reduces epistemology to 
dogged psychological prejudices’ (Baldwin and Thune 2008, 451).10 
 In reply, I would urge that it is incorrect that on the current proposal defeater-defeat 
requires nothing more than a ‘dogged prejudice’ to hold on to one’s beliefs. Defeating the 
defeater of religious pluralism does require additional support. The point is that this support 
need not necessarily come from reasons. It can also come from the same non-inferential 
cognitive processes that originally produced the beliefs. It is also incorrect that religious 
beliefs become ‘immune from defeat’. An exclusivist may fail—temporarily or indefinitely—
to secure the additional support required, in which case her belief remains defeated. Nothing 
guarantees proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis or a renewed IIHS. 
 Thirdly, someone may propose that adherents of other religions can appeal to an analogous 
procedure for defeater-defeat. They, too, might report that their religious beliefs have been 
powerfully reproduced in them so that they now strongly believe they are right again. 
Wouldn’t this constitute yet another defeater for the exclusivist’s religious beliefs? And isn’t 
it implausible to reply that this defeater, too, could be defeated by yet another powerful 
working of the sensus divinitatis and/or renewed IIHS? Doesn’t that lead to a possibly infinite 
succession of defeaters and defeater-defeaters? 
 Two things in reply. (1) The reformed epistemologist need not concede that this scenario 
gives the exclusivist a new defeater. Once an exclusivist has defeated the defeater of 
pluralism by means of the above procedure, further testimony by adherents of other religions 
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no longer constitutes a defeater relative to her overall noetic structure.11 For that structure 
now includes a belief that adherents of other religions are epistemically less fortunate than she 
is; this belief being inferred from her reproduced properly basic first-order religious beliefs. 
As a result, their testimony can be dismissed. Or if the exclusivist’s noetic structure doesn’t 
include such an explicit belief, it will at least include an awareness that others may hold their 
religious beliefs with equal sincerity and conviction. Given this awareness, however, further 
testimony adds nothing new to the exclusivist’s epistemic situation and hence doesn’t give her 
a new defeater. (2) But even if the reformed epistemologist were to admit that further 
testimony does give the exclusivist a new defeater, I don’t see why there would be anything 
wrong—given RE’s epistemological outlook—in holding that this new defeater could be 
defeated by yet another working of the sensus divinitatis or IIHS. If the procedure was 
defensible the first time around, it is also defensible the second time in an exactly analogous 
way. This indeed leads to an exclusivism that vacillates, but it may be recalled that we now 
only see through a glass, darkly, in religious matters. 
 Fourthly, although I am convinced that Plantinga’s suggestion is fundamentally sound, I 
admit that the situation Plantinga envisages for a pluralism-aware exclusivist is indeed 
epistemically unattractive. Consider how her situation looks from her own perspective. She is 
firmly convinced of the truth of her religious beliefs. However, she need not know (nor even 
believe) that she is rational in believing as she does. When pressed, she might have to admit 
that nothing she can say will convince adherents of other religions of the truth of her own 
beliefs. Although she takes adherents of other religions to be epistemically less well-off, she 
can offer nothing to substantiate this, besides her own conviction that she is right. Obviously, 
such a situation is unattractive, at least in so far as rationality has anything to do with 
discussing and justifying one’s own ideas in a dialectical situation.12 It exemplifies a kind of 
epistemic isolation that it would be preferable not to be in. 
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 However, it does not follow that the exclusivist is irrational in sticking to her beliefs. There 
are lots of states one can be in that are epistemically unattractive, but that do not make one 
any less rational. For instance, believing falsehoods on the basis of misleading evidence or not 
believing important truths because one has not been properly exposed to them. A defender of 
RE can readily admit that the exclusivist’s situation is unfortunate, but insist that it is 
sometimes the best one can do. Surely it would be epistemically preferable if we could always 
justify our true beliefs with publicly available and objective evidence that convinces those 
who demur, but such is not our privilege. This does not prove that rational exclusive religious 
belief is impossible. 
 
Must reasons be retained? 
 
Suppose the argument of the previous section fails and that NR is correct after all. Have 
Baldwin and Thune then succeeded in showing that rational religious belief cannot be basic 
for an exclusivist who is aware of pluralism? No, I will argue. RR, too, is false because 
defeater-defeaters for religious pluralism may well be of the Drain-O variety. The reason is 
that excluding this possibility requires an independence constraint on admissible defeater-
defeaters that leads to fairly widespread scepticism and is therefore unattractive. 
 Although Baldwin and Thune assert that defeater-defeaters for religious pluralism will 
always be table-legs, they do not provide an argument to back up their claim. Let us first 
consider what a Drain-O defeater might look like for the case at hand. Suppose an exclusivist 
comes to believe—through reading a book on apologetics, say—that adherents of other 
religions are deceived by Satan into believing they have veridical religious experiences of a 
deity. God allows this because He is intent on testing the faith of his elect by exposing them 
to misleading testimony. This story would constitute a Drain-O defeater-defeater, for it 
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provides the exclusivist with a reason not to take the testimony of adherents of other religions 
seriously while it adds nothing new to support the exclusivist’s own religious beliefs. It is like 
learning that your friend John was joking when he testified to the whiteness of the table in my 
earlier example. Having acquired such a defeater-defeater, you can forget about the whole 
affair and your belief goes back to its original proper basicality. 
 Apparently, then, Baldwin and Thune think all defeater-defeaters of this kind are ruled out. 
The most plausible explanation for this is that they implicitly take for granted some kind of 
independence constraint on admissible defeater-defeaters, which attempts to rule out defeater-
defeaters that somehow depend for their rationality on the rationality of the original 
(threatened) belief.13 Without some such constraint, there is no reason to think that Drain-O 
defeaters are impossible and hence no reason to believe RR. Perhaps Baldwin and Thune 
believe something like David Silver’s version of such a constraint is correct: 
 
Z cannot neutralize X as a potential defeater for Y if Z is evidentially dependent on Y 
(Silver 2001, 9), 
 
where 
 
belief Z is evidentially dependent on belief Y for agent S just in case it is rational for S to 
believe that the warrant for Z is derivative of the warrant for Y. Otherwise Z is evidentially 
independent of Y for agent S. (ibid., 8) 
 
Presumably, this constraint would rule out the above story as a defeater-defeater, because the 
rationality of believing that story is derivative of the rationality of the exclusivist’s original 
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religious beliefs (although perhaps only indirectly so through being derivative of the 
rationality of the apologetics book’s author’s religious beliefs).14 
 I want to suggest that Baldwin and Thune would do well not to embrace any such 
unqualified independence constraints, as they engender fairly widespread scepticism, not only 
for religious matters, but also for many philosophical, political and moral matters. Such 
scepticism, moreover, undermines their own conclusion. 
 To see why this is so, notice that the independence constraint above in effect demands that 
one has a non-question-begging argument or other source of epistemic support to back up 
one’s belief. While this is usually feasible for beliefs about mundane matters such as the 
colour of tables and your friend’s party attendance, it is far from obvious that this standard 
can be met for religious, ethical, political, and philosophical beliefs (Van Inwagen 1996, 
2010, Elga 2010, Kelly 2010). In philosophical controversy, for instance, both parties can 
often marshal impressive arguments for their beliefs, as well as weighty objections to the 
other party’s beliefs, clever responses to defuse these objections, and so on. Although there is 
no room to argue the point here, I am convinced that ultimately one’s evaluation of the 
successfulness of the arguments, objections, and responses comes down to basic philosophical 
intuitions, which cannot themselves be defended by further non-question-begging arguments. 
Any attempt to defeat defeaters for one’s philosophical beliefs, then, must sooner or later 
presuppose the truth of such basic intuitions. However, one’s philosophical beliefs also 
depend on the same intuitions for their ultimate support. So we have a scenario in which, 
ultimately, basic intuitions are supposed to defeat defeaters for beliefs, the rationality of 
which is derivative of the rationality of those very same intuitions. This violates the 
independence constraint. As a result, many philosophical beliefs will be beset by undefeated 
defeaters and must therefore be given up. The same holds for controversial—which is to say 
many—moral, political, and religious beliefs.15 
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 The point can also be brought out by considering Baldwin and Thune’s discussion of 
Vogelstein’s case of a moral realist who receives testimony from a sociopath to the effect that 
there are no moral truths (Vogelstein 2004, 189).16 Baldwin and Thune say the moral realist 
can easily defeat the defeater presented by the sociopath’s testimony. The relevant defeater-
defeater ‘involves the conjunction of (1) the fact that there are good arguments for moral 
realism and (2) the fact that one person’s testimony against moral realism is, given (1), of 
little epistemic value’ (Baldwin and Thune 2008, 449). The arguments they have in mind are 
those available in the philosophical literature. 
 Now suppose that we exchange the sociopath for a competent philosopher, who is a 
passionate defender of moral antirealism.17 This philosopher is able to offer objections to any 
epistemically significant reason for moral realism the realist can muster. If what I said above 
about philosophical arguments—to wit, that their evaluation is ultimately a matter of basic 
philosophical intuitions—is roughly correct, then the moral realist will violate an 
independence constraint if she sticks to her belief. She must appeal to reasons that depend 
crucially on her basic realist intuitions for their ultimate support. Hence, the rational thing to 
do—for both the realist and the antirealist—would be to give up their respective beliefs and 
become agnostic. 
 Given that this case is structurally similar to many controversies in religion, ethics, 
politics, and philosophy, anyone who embraces an independence constraint of the kind we 
have been considering in effect embraces widespread scepticism in these areas. For Baldwin 
and Thune specifically this entails that they ought to give up their conclusion that an 
exclusivist who is aware of pluralism cannot hold religious beliefs in a properly basic way, 
since that conclusion itself is confronted with counter-arguments from other philosophers and 
the only way to defend it may well be by arguments that ultimately beg the question against 
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the epistemological externalism RE promotes—that is what I take my four remarks at the end 
of the previous section to hint at. 
 In sum, then, independence constraints of the sort we have been looking at are unattractive 
and therefore we have no reason to believe RR is correct. If RR is false, however, it remains 
possible for an exclusivist to obtain a Drain-O defeater-defeater, in which case her religious 
beliefs could go back to being rational in the manner of properly basic beliefs. 
 
A better argument against exclusivism? 
 
Baldwin and Thune’s argument fails. But perhaps there is a better argument for the 
conclusion that exclusivism cannot be rational in the manner of properly basic beliefs lurking 
nearby. 
 Like most epistemologies, RE is fallibilist; at least in the sense that it allows for rationally 
held but false beliefs. The facts of religious pluralism show that people who, for all 
appearances, are equally intellectually, morally, and spiritually virtuous hold religious beliefs 
that are incompatible with the exclusivist’s beliefs and perhaps also that they do so, partly, 
because they claim to have access to a special source of religious knowledge that others lack. 
This makes the possibility that the exclusivist’s own religious beliefs are false and her special 
source unreliable salient. Upon appreciating this possibility, the exclusivist should acquire a 
higher-order belief that her religious beliefs may well be wrong and that she may well lack 
access to a special source of religious knowledge. This belief isn’t a defeater of the kind we 
considered above as it isn’t incompatible with anything the exclusivist believes. Nonetheless, 
it seems that this higher-order belief ought to have a downward effect on the exclusivist’s 
first-order religious beliefs and lead her to reduce her confidence or even suspend judgement 
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on contested religious matters.18 Not doing so surely exhibits some kind of epistemic defect or 
negligence. 
 This line of thinking receives further support from a comparison with other sources of 
basic beliefs. Suppose you and a friend both look out a window and see a car. Your friend 
says it’s a model A whereas you see it to be a model B. From what the both of you can tell, 
your beliefs are formed in normally favourable circumstances, there are no obstacles in your 
respective lines of sight, you both have equally good eyesight, are equally knowledgeable 
about cars, aren’t confused in any relevant way, etc. Taking another look doesn’t resolve your 
disagreement. Wouldn’t the rational thing to do be to suspend judgement? Or take memory 
beliefs. Your friend and you both try to remember what colour shirt Bob was wearing 
yesterday. Again, for all you can tell, you are both equally well-poised to remember correctly, 
there are no confusions, etc. Yet your friend says Bob’s shirt was green and you remember it 
was blue. Careful reconsideration and exchange of information doesn’t resolve your 
disagreement. Shouldn’t the both of you give up your beliefs and suspend judgement? 
 This seems to me to be the strongest case from religious pluralism against exclusivism that 
doesn’t beg any questions against RE’s externalism. But I don’t think it is conclusive. I will 
consider three things that can be said on behalf of RE. First of all, the reformed epistemologist 
can readily admit that awareness of religious pluralism calls for reduced confidence. An 
exclusivist who is properly sensitive to the deeply ambiguous epistemic situation in which she 
and others form religious beliefs, will hold her beliefs with epistemic humility. However, it 
doesn’t follow that suspension of judgement is rationally required. Pluralism might decrease 
one’s confidence, but not necessarily below the threshold for rational (or warranted) belief. 
 This might seem a little feeble in the absence of an explanation for how the warrant for the 
exclusivist’s religious beliefs manages to stay above the threshold. That brings me to a second 
point. The defender of RE can once more insist on a thoroughly externalist understanding of 
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rationality. If, even while being fully and vividly aware of every relevant fact of religious 
pluralism, it strongly seems to the exclusivist that her religious beliefs are correct, then if this 
strong seeming is in fact brought about by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis and/or a 
renewed IIHS, her first-order religious beliefs will be rational, no matter what additional 
higher-order beliefs about the possibility of being wrong she may simultaneously entertain. 
She can even infer counterbalancing higher-order beliefs (e.g., that even though she may be 
wrong, it strongly seems to her that she is in fact right) from her renewed first-order beliefs.19 
 To put this in perspective, it is important to see that what is being claimed here is not that 
everyone, regardless of their favoured notion of rationality, must admit that the above 
scenario restores the rationality of exclusivism. The point is that exclusivism is rendered 
rational in the specific externalist sense endorsed by RE. Furthermore, the reformed 
epistemologist can grant that exclusivist adherents of other religions (who, we can safely 
assume, may feel just as strongly about the seeming truth of their religious beliefs) may also 
be rational in the qualified sense of internal rationality, although—assuming Christian theism 
to be true—they fall short of full rationality because they are not externally rational (see note 
4 for this distinction). Given the input to their cognitive faculties, there is nothing wrong with 
their belief formation, but—again assuming Christian theism—their input itself (‘upstream 
from experience’) is not what it ought to be. Finally, it may help to consider what the 
alternatives are. Suppose it is accepted that withholding judgement is the rational response, at 
least until one gathers further support for the truth of one’s beliefs from other sources. As we 
saw in the previous section, this easily leads down a path to widespread scepticism, not only 
in religious matters, but also in philosophy, politics, and ethics. While some may find this 
acceptable or even appropriate, I take such an outcome to show that one’s construal of 
rationality has gone astray. 
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 Thirdly and finally, in view of the analogy with perceptual and memory beliefs the 
defender of RE could develop her notion of rationality to allow for a differential treatment of 
different kinds of beliefs.20 There are at least two features of the perception and memory cases 
above that account for the intuitive rightness of suspension of belief. First, in real-life versions 
of such cases, there usually is an easy method available to settle the disagreement. You walk 
closer to the car or look the model up on the internet. You ask Bob about his shirt. It is 
therefore inappropriate to just hold on to your beliefs and not employ such a method of 
verification. Secondly, persistent disagreement hardly ever occurs in real-life cases of this 
kind. So if it does, something exceptional or weird must be going on. In consequence, all bets 
are off and you should withhold judgement. These two features are perspicuously absent in 
the case of religious belief (and also in many typical cases of philosophical, moral, and 
political beliefs). There are no (independent) methods of verification available and persistent 
disagreement is ubiquitous. Because of that, it not at all clear that it is rationally inappropriate 
to stick to these kinds of beliefs if they strongly seem true to you, even while you are fully 
aware of persistent disagreements and the impossibility of their resolution. The defender of 
RE can therefore reply that the above analogy is beside the point, because rationality gives 
different prescriptions for perceptual and memorial beliefs than it does for religious beliefs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Baldwin and Thune’s attack on RE’s defence of exclusivism fails. The reformed 
epistemologist need not accept NR, while RR can only be made plausible with the help of an 
independence constraint that leads to unattractive fairly widespread scepticism. An argument 
similar to Baldwin and Thune’s which doesn’t rely on NR or RR also fails to establish the 
desired conclusion. As far as I can see, this exhausts the resources for arguing from pluralism 
20 
 
against RE’s defence of exclusivism. I therefore conclude that RE’s defence of the possibility 
of rationally holding religious beliefs in the basic way, even for an exclusivist who is aware of 
the facts of religious pluralism, remains as plausible as it ever was.21 
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1 I choose not to follow Baldwin and Thune (2008) in speaking about ‘exclusive beliefs’. That 
expression strikes me as inaccurate since any belief is exclusive in the sense that, if one holds 
it, one holds incompatible beliefs to be untrue. Hence, exclusivism is not so much a property 
of beliefs as it is a position or attitude of a person holding certain beliefs, to wit that of 
continuing to hold that one is right and others wrong while not having a knock-down 
argument for one’s own beliefs (cf. Plantinga (2000, 440) a definition of exclusivism along 
these lines). 
2 Their paper builds on earlier work by David Silver (2001) and replies to Eric Vogelstein’s 
(2004) criticisms of Silver. 
3 This ‘principle of testimony’ is accepted by everyone in the debate, cf. Plantinga (1993, 77–
82), Silver (2001, 5), and Baldwin and Thune (2008, 446). 
4 Here and throughout, ‘rationality’ should be understood in RE’s characteristic sense of 
having properly functioning cognitive faculties. Full rationality in this sense requires both 
what Plantinga (2000, 110–113) calls internal and external rationality. Internal rationality 
consists in proper function ‘downstream from experience’: forming the right beliefs in 
response to one’s cognitive input of sensuous imagery and doxastic experience, having 
coherent beliefs, drawing the right inferences, making the right decisions given one’s beliefs, 
and fulfilling one’s epistemic duties. External rationality consists in proper function ‘upstream 
from experience’: forming the right kind of cognitive input, i.e., sensuous imagery and 
doxastic experience. 
5 The passage is directly below the one quoted by Baldwin and Thune. In it, (1) and (2) stand 
for the following two religious claims: 
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(1) The world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing and perfectly good personal 
being (the sort of being who holds beliefs, has aims and intentions, and can act to 
accomplish these aims); and (2) Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a 
unique way of salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of 
his divine son. (Plantinga 2000, 438). 
6 Note that my interpretation of Plantinga differs from the Principle of Testimonial Evidence 
(PTE) that Vogelstein endorses to defend Plantinga: 
 
If I believe a proposition P in the basic way, then if I hear testimony that ~P and have no 
further defeater for P or ~P, I ought to weigh the strength of my inclination to believe that 
P against the strength of my inclination to believe that ~P (based on that testimony) in 
order to determine whether to believe P, ~P, or neither P nor ~P. (Vogelstein 2004, 190) 
 
Pace Vogelstein, I concede to Baldwin and Thune that simply weighing the strengths of your 
inclinations to believe is not enough. In the face of pluralism, one really needs additional 
support for one’s religious beliefs. However, pace Baldwin and Thune I am urging that this 
support may come from the same quasi-perceptual and testimonial sources that originally 
produced the beliefs and need not stem from (independent) reasons. 
7 Pryor (2001) provides a helpful overview of the many different versions of externalism. 
Here I take externalism as the denial of the theses that rationality requires that one have 
special access to (1) the grounds for one’s beliefs and (2) the epistemic status of one’s beliefs 
(e.g., their rationality or the adequacy of the grounds on which they are based). This is RE’s 
brand of externalism. 
8 Vogel (2000, 2008) objects to exactly this feature of externalist epistemologies, arguing that 
it allows for illegitimate bootstrapping. Cohen (2002, 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and Weisberg 
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(forthcoming), however, argue that the problem generalizes to internalist epistemologies and 
is independent of the internalism/externalism controversy. 
9 As Plantinga (2000, 453) says about the exclusivist in such a situation: 
 
She must think that there is an important epistemic difference: she thinks that somehow the 
other person has made a mistake, or has a blind spot, or hasn’t been wholly attentive, or 
hasn’t received some grace she has, or is blinded by ambition or pride or mother love or 
something else; she must think that she has access to a source of warranted belief the other 
lacks. 
10 Although the quote is part of an objection levelled to Vogelstein’s PTE, the worry it 
expresses can also be raised for what I have been saying. 
11 See Plantinga (2000, 360–363) for the point that defeaters are always relative to a person’s 
total noetic structure.  
12 Alston (1988, 273) suggests that the notion of justification derives from the idea of 
dialectically justifying one’s beliefs. 
13 One could read their endorsement of what Vogelstein calls the Principle of Testimonial 
Defeat (PTD) in this vein (Baldwin and Thune 2008, 447–451). This principle, which 
Vogelstein ends up rejecting, reads as follows: 
 
If I believe proposition P in the basic way, then if I hear testimony that ~P, I ought to 
believe neither P nor ~P (or equivalently, P and ~P act as defeaters for each other) unless I 
have a defeater for ~P other than P (in which case I ought to believe P), or a defeater for P 
other than ~P (in which case I ought to believe ~P). (Vogelstein 2004, 189) 
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14 Such indirect dependence introduces complications for the formulation of any plausible 
independency constraint that neither Silver nor Baldwin and Thune address, but that is not my 
concern here. 
15 Here I disagree with Silver (2001, 12–15) who thinks the ensuing scepticism can mostly be 
warded off or, where it cannot, is warranted. 
16 It is unfortunate that Vogelstein sets up his case around a sociopath, for someone’s being a 
sociopath is already sufficient reason not to take his or her testimony on moral and social 
matters seriously. (We don’t take testimony of a colour-blind on colours seriously either.) 
Baldwin and Thune rightly exploit this weakness in their reply. 
17 If someone wants to object that the testimony of one antirealist is not enough to be taken 
seriously, you can bring in whatever number of antirealists is deemed sufficient. 
18 Kelly (2010, 158ff.) calls this ‘downward epistemic push’. 
19 Kelly (2010, 159) labels this ‘upward epistemic push’. Cf. also note 8 above for worries 
about bootstrapping. 
20 I’m not aware of any attempts to try this for Plantinga’s form of RE, but Alston’s (1991) 
doxastic practice approach is sensitive to the fact that rationality may amount to slightly 
different things for different kinds of belief-forming practices. 
21 I am grateful to Martijn Blaauw, Ian Church, Rik Peels, Herman Philipse, and René van 
Woudenberg for helpful comments on an earlier version. An anonymous referee deserves 
special thanks for inviting me to develop my argument in a further direction. 
